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Abstract
We address the performance of selfish network routing in multi-commodity flows where
the latency or delay function on edges is dependent on the flow of individual commodities,
rather than on the aggregate flow. An application of this study is the analysis of a network
with differentiated traffic, i.e., in transportation networks where there are multiple types of
traffic and in networks where traffic is prioritized according to type classification. We consider
the inefficiency of equilibrium in this model and provide price of anarchy bounds for networks
with k (types of) commodities where each link is associated with heterogeneous polynomial
delays, i.e., commodity i on edge e faces delay specified by hei (f1(e), f2(e), . . . , fk(e)) where
fi(e) is the flow of the ith commodity through edge e and h
e
i () a polynomial delay function
applicable to the ith commodity. We consider both atomic and non-atomic flows and show
bounds on the price of anarchy that depend on the relative impact of each type of traffic on
the edge delay where the delay functions are polynomials of degree θ, e.g.,
∑
i aifi(e)
θ. The
price of anarchy is unbounded for arbitrary polynomials.
For networks with decomposable delay functions where the delay is the same for all com-
modities using the edge, i.e., delays on edge e are defined by he(f1(e), f2(e), . . . , fk(e)), we
show improved bounds on the price of anarchy, for both non-atomic and atomic flows.
The results illustrate that the inefficiency of selfish routing worsens in the case of het-
erogeneous delays as compared to the standard delay functions that do not consider type
differentiation.
1 Introduction
A typical road network serves multiple types of traffic and each type has a different impact
on the delay experienced on a link. The same is also true for computer network routing where
traffic of different types may be generated via priority mechanisms. The common theme in these
networks is the lack of a centralized control, and thus each source-destination pair chooses routes
based on optimizing an objective. This problem can be modeled using game theory where each
agent or player selfishly chooses its route, with Nash equilibrium being achieved when all the
players have an optimum route for their own traffic, given the routes of the other players as
fixed. There are two categories of games considered, the non-atomic routing game, where each
player controls a negligible amount of traffic and the atomic routing game, where each user can
utilize only one routing path to satisfy its requirement.
These routing games can be formalized as weighted congestion games on a network, where
traffic requirements of multiple types of network users are to be routed between corresponding
source and destination pairs. Each edge has a delay (latency) function that is dependent on
the traffic of each user type present on that edge. To satisfy their traffic requirements, users
determine their own routes using a selfish routing strategy (one that minimizes the delay faced on
the paths chosen by the individual user). A centralized optimal routing solution would optimize
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user routes with respect to a measure of social benefit, the typical objective being the sum total
of delays faced by the users; however the selfish strategic routing game introduces inefficiencies
since Nash equilibrium solutions, being optimal for each individual player given the strategies of
other players, do not necessarily optimize the social benefit. Our focus of study is the inefficiency
of network routing games that consider multiple types of traffic.
The degradation of network performance that results from competitive selfish routing, as
compared to a global optimum solution, and measured with respect to the total latency or delay
of the flow has been quantified in [13, 27] where they considered the price of anarchy (PoA).
In the flow routing context, this is defined to be the ratio of the total latency of the Nash
equilibrium routing to the total latency of the optimum routing. The bounds that have been
obtained in these previous works apply to latency or delay on edges that are a function of the
aggregate flow on the edge. In this paper we consider an important generalization that models
the above mentioned scenario of heterogeneous traffic on k-commodity networks: in this model,
edges are associated with delay functions that are dependent on the type of the commodity,
which we term as heterogeneous delay functions. An example is a polynomial delay of the form∑
i ai(e)f
θ
i (e)+c(e) with positive co-efficients and non-negative constant, where fi(e) represents
the traffic contribution of the ith commodity on edge e, and θ ∈ N the degree of the polynomial.
In general, we model the total delay in heterogeneous networks using the following total
(heterogeneous) delay function:
∑
i,e fi(e)Φ
i
e(f1, . . . , fk) =
∑
i,e fi(e)h
e
i (f1(e), f2(e), . . . , fk(e))
where fi(e) is the flow function and h
e
i : Rk → R+ a convex, monotonically increasing, polynomial
delay function for commodity i on edge e, respectively. Note that the distinctive property of
this delay function is that the domain is multi-dimensional. If the delay function, Φie(f(e)), is
expressible as he(f1(e), f2(e), . . . , fk(e)), i.e., the delay function on the edge is independent of
the commodity, then we call this delay function decomposable. This is an interesting class of
functions, since it addresses the case when the delay on an edge is the same as experienced by
each of the multiple types of users. We also consider uniform delay functions where the delay
on every edge of the network is the same function of the flow; however, the constant term may
differ.
The generalized model we consider, has applications in transport networks utilized by het-
erogeneous modes of transport and studied by Dafermos in [8]. Both decomposable and uniform
delay models are also applicable in the study of road networks. The uniform model is applicable
when roads are of the same or similar type, the delays having the same functional dependency
on the flow vector. As another application, in the context of internet traffic we propose the
use of this model when traffic is prioritized (applicable to the net-neutrality debate [18, 20]).
Users with higher priority are allowed to transmit more bits over a fixed period (unit) of time
or equivalently are allowed to transmit larger packets of information thus occupying the link
for a longer fraction of time. Consequently, the contribution of the delay induced by each type
of user traffic is different. We provide additional discussion of these motivating applications,
including priority queue models, later in the section. A detailed analysis of priority models forms
an interesting topic of further research.
We study Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the defined heterogeneous delay
model: our results show that the PoA worsens as compared with networks models where the
delay is only a function of f(e), the aggregate flow on the edge. This indicates that type
differentiation amongst traffic can lead to a worse price of anarchy, a result that contrasts with
the price of anarchy in the case of uniform and equal treatment of traffic types.
We consider both atomic and non-atomic flows, discussed above. In both categories, we
provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy when there are k types of commodities
in networks with heterogeneous and decomposable (including uniform) class of polynomial delay
functions. In particular, we show asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy when the
edges are associated with affine decomposable delay functions.
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Previous Work: The study of equilibrium in flow routing problems was initiated by Pigou
[21], and furthered by Wardrop [28]. Dafermos and Sparrow [11] furthered this study and
considered the relationship between flows that are at Nash Equilibrium and flows that optimize
a social welfare function. For a multi-commodity flow network with convex delay functions
on the edges, they establish a condition under which the flow satisfies both Nash Equilibrium
conditions and also optimizes an aggregate objective function. In this model the delay is a
function only of the total flow through the edge. The assumption is that units traveling along a
link uniformly share the cost [11]. The interesting aspect of this work is that for homogeneous
polynomial costs that are a function of the aggregate variable f(e), Nash equilibrium and social
optimum solutions coincide. This is not so in a general setting. Investigation of the inefficiency of
Nash Equilibrium [12] in network flows led to an analysis of price of anarchy for load dependent
delays [13]. Roughgarden and Tardos initiated the study of bounds on the price of anarchy
[27] in general networks followed by subsequent results of Roughgarden [24, 25, 26] that use the
Pigou bound. Additional results may be found by Correa et al. [6, 7] in their studies of the price
of anarchy with respect to the total latency as well as the average and the maximum latency. An
aspect that distinguishes the research in [7] is their use of geometric analysis in computing the
price of anarchy. The results in [27, 24] show that for polynomial delays, the price of anarchy is
bounded by the degree of the polynomial and does not depend on the size of the network. This
is indeed a surprising result. As an extension, our results provide bounds for the more general
class of heterogeneous delay functions that depend on the characteristics of the delay function.
For the case when the min-max delay of paths is used as the social welfare measure, results of
Weitz[29] and in [14] show that for arbitrary increasing delay functions, the price of anarchy
does depend on the size of the network.
For atomic flows, the price of anarchy [4] has been investigated for the typical unsplittable
model with aggregate delay functions, i.e., delays are independent of types of commodities. The
results show that the bound is dependent on the degree of the polynomial used to model the
delay (O(dd) where d is the degree of the polynomial). Further, improved and exact bounds were
proved on the worst-case PoA for unweighted and weighted in atomic unsplittable congestion
games in [3]. Techniques that depend on Pigou bounds do not carry over and the authors utilize
the similarity of Nash equilibrium solutions with solutions obtained by a greedy algorithm for
an on-line version of the problem. Note that Nash equilibrium solutions satisfy a variational
inequality arising from local optimality conditions. We utilize this approach to provide bounds
on the price of anarchy for networks with generalized heterogeneous delay functions; the analysis
is based primarily on variational inequalities that arise in the atomic version of the problem.
The notion of commodity dependent delays was first studied in Dafermos [8, 9] in which the
author considers a transportation network where travel time on a link depends on the delays
of the types of traffic. One example of such a delay function, for edge e and commodity i, is
provided by Φie(f1, . . . , fk) =
∑
j gij(e)fi(e)fj(e) + hi(e)fi(e), where gij and hi are constants
and i, j represent commodities. Dafermos [8, 9] establishes a condition ([gij ] must be a positive
definite matrix) under which the flow (i) satisfies Nash Equilibrium conditions and (ii) optimizes
an aggregate objective function.
Further related work is the research on player-specific congestion games [15, 2], a model
which allows for player specific delays but which still uses the aggregate flow to compute delays.
To our knowledge, the price of anarchy for heterogeneous latency functions has not been
studied before.
Motivation We outline motivations from two different areas, one being transportation engi-
neering and the other computer networks.
Transportation Networks. In transportation science, traffic equilibrium has been considered
extensively to analyze transportation systems, starting with the work of Wardrop. Note that
this prior work has limitations in modeling multiple vehicle types or multi-modal networks. In
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order to provide more accurate modeling, transportation science models were extended to the
multi-class model where the demand is partitioned into multiple classes and the cost of a route
is dependent on the traffic of all user classes along the route[9].
Multi-class models have been defined to extend the notion of Wardrop equilibrium, by Dafer-
mos and Potts and Oliver[22, 9], where in the latter paper they used the generalized BPR (Bureau
of Public Roads) model that depend on multiple class parameters. Multi-class models may also
be found in [17].
Computer Networks. Another motivation of this research comes from a study of the impact
of providing differentiated service to different types of traffic. Suppose we have k types of traffic
and traffic types are given priorities. The delay function for the class with the kth priority in a
M/G/1 queuing system is E(Tk) = E(R)/(1−
∑
1≤j≤k−1 ρj)(1−
∑
1≤j≤k ρj), where E(R) is the
mean residual service time and ρk is the load of the class-k traffic. The average delay is obtained
from the expected delay of all commodities [5]. As a first attempt to study selfish behavior in
queues with differentiated service rates, these delays may be modeled by a polynomial, possibly
a monomial using the dominant term obtained from a Taylor series expansion. The study of
polynomial delay functions that is reported in this paper is applicable in this context.
Furthermore, in this paper we utilize the traditional routing model where users are able to
plan routing paths based on the delays in the network. These results thus apply to transportation
network and computer network routings that rely on the link state of the network. A possible
extension would be to find the price of anarchy when other internet routing models are used
[19].
Before we outline our results we present our model and some formal definitions:
1.1 Model and Definitions
We consider a directed network G = (V,E) with a vertex set V , an edge set E, and a set K
of k ∈ N source-destination pairs {s1, t1}, . . . , {sk, tk}, each corresponding to a different traffic
type. We do not allow self-loops for any vertex but accept parallel edges between any pair of
vertices.
For commodity i, denote the set of (simple) si-ti paths by P i, and define a set of paths
P = ⋃P i. For any path P ∈ P i, define a flow, f iP ∈ R+ to be the flow of commodity i that is
assigned to path P . The set of all flows is represented by the flow vector f = (f iP )i∈K,P∈Pi . For
a fixed flow f , commodity i and an edge e ∈ E denote the flow of commodity i through edge
e by fi(e) =
∑
P∈Pi|e∈P f
i
P and the flow vector on the edge by f(e) = (fi(e))i∈K . The total
aggregate flow through edge e is denoted by ||f(e)||1 =
∑
i fi(e). The demand requirement of
commodities 1 through k is denoted by R = (r1, . . . , rk) where ri ∈ N represents the amount of
flow required to be routed from source si to destination ti. A feasible flow f is one where the
demand requirement for each commodity is satisfied, i.e.,
∑
P∈Pi f
i
P = ri, ∀i.
We let Φe : Rk → R+ be a heterogeneous delay function, as defined below, on edge e,
and assume that Φe(f(e)), f(e) ∈ Rk is monotonically increasing w.r.t components of f(e) and
convex. The delay experienced by commodity i on a path P ∈ P i is defined to be
ΦiP (f) =
∑
e∈P
Φie(f1(e), . . . , fk(e))
where Φie(f1(e), . . . , fk(e)) is the delay faced by commodity i on edge e, given the flow vector
f and will be represented by Φie(f(e)). Furthermore, fi(e) will be referred to as fi when e is
evident from the context.
A heterogeneous delay function is a generalization of the standard aggregate delay function.
We consider polynomial heterogeneous delay functions where the delay function on edge e for
commodity i is represented by Φie(f(e)) =
∑
1≤`≤N ie gi`(e)hi`(f, e) + ci(e) where ∀(i, `, e), gi`(e)
and ci(e) are nonnegative real valued constants. Here, hi`(f, e) is any arbitrary monomial (with
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co-efficient one) in terms of the flow vector f and dependent on edge e; and there are N ie terms
in the polynomial Φie(f). Unfortunately, these functions will be shown to have unbounded price
of anarchy (see Section 2.2, in particular Lemma 2.3).
As in [4], we study polynomials that are of the form
∑
i aix
θ
i , where θ ∈ N and ∀i : ai ∈ R++.
We actually consider a class of more general polynomials that extend this form. Any polynomial
delay that does not have the defined structure of terms will be shown to have a price of anarchy
that is dependent on requirements or is unbounded. We formalize this set of polynomials below.
We define a delay to be a θ-complete polynomial delay (or simply θ-polynomial delay), θ ∈ N,
if the delay function is of the form:
Φie(f) =
∑
1≤j≤k
aij(e)f
θ
j +
∑
1≤`≤Lie
gi`(e)f
θ`1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k + ci(e)
where Lie ∈ N and ∀`, θ`j ∈ N, θ`j < θ with
∑k
j=1 θ
`
j = θ. Also, ∀(i, j, e): aij(e) ∈ R++ and
∀(i, `, e): gi`(e), c(e) ∈ R+. Let N ie = Lie+k+1 denote the number of terms in the polynomial Φie.
Further, we use NΦ = maxi,eN
i
e to represent the maximum number of terms in the polynomial
Φie(f) over all i ∈ K and e ∈ E. Note that for linear functions, NΦ is bounded by k + 1, the
number of traffic types. We assume w.l.o.g that all positive coefficients and constants are scaled
uniformly to be greater than one. Moreover, with this assumption, the maximum value of the
ratio of the co-efficients and constants, i.e. max{maxi,`,e gi`(e),maxi,j,e{aij(e)},maxi,e ci(e)}, is
denoted by amax.
In the case of heterogeneous delay functions, as defined above, each commodity has a dif-
ferent, commodity related, delay function on the same edge e. However, under the condition
that ∀(i, e): gi`(e) = g`(e), hi`(e) = h`(e) and ∀(i, j, e): ci(e) = cj(e) = c(e), the polynomial
heterogeneous delay function Φie(f) (with Le ∈ N monomial terms) is expressible as
Φe(f1, . . . , fk) =
∑
1≤`≤Le
g`(e)h`(f, e) + c(e)
Such a delay function is termed as decomposable.
Additionally, we define uniform functions as decomposable delay functions of the form:
Φe(f) =
∑
1≤`≤LΦ g`h`(f) + c(e), where the delay function (with LΦ monomial terms) is the
same function of the flow, across all edges. Note that the constant term is still edge dependent.
Such a function may be used to model a network where the queues on each edge have the same
parameters arising from using the same underlying technology.
Both, non-atomic and atomic flows are considered in this paper. In non-atomic flows, the
flow of the ith commodity on a path P ∈ Pi can be arbitrarily small, representing the fact that
the player corresponding to any one commodity controls a negligible amount of traffic, resulting
in multiple paths being used to satisfy requirements. In atomic flows, each commodity i can use
only one path to push the required units of flow ri ∈ N.
We represent a network flow routing game by the triple G = (G,R,Φ). For a game G, we
define the social cost to be the sum total of all delays on edges over flows of all commodities, i.e.,
C(f) =
∑
e
∑
i fi(e)Φ
i
e(f(e)). Let fNE and fˆ be a Nash Equilibrium and a social optimum flow,
respectively and let the social optimum cost CSO(fˆ) = minf C(f) where fˆ = arg minf C(f).
The price of anarchy is defined as:
PoA(G) = sup
fNE∈N (G)
C(fNE)
CSO(fˆ)
where N (G) is the set of all Nash Equilibrium solutions of the game G.
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1.2 Results
Our study of equilibrium flows in networks with heterogeneous delay functions provides multiple
results on the existence of equilibrium and the price of anarchy. We describe below, the results
that we obtained for both the the non-atomic and atomic models.
Results for Non-atomic Network Flows: To analyze this class of problems, we introduce
a multi-dimensional version of the Pigou bound [27] that includes a parameter which we term
as the Gamma bound. Combining the two, provides us bounds on the price of anarchy for
non-atomic flows.
We show that the price of anarchy for the general class of convex heterogeneous functions
can become unbounded, even growing with the flow requirement. This contrasts with results
for delay functions that only depend on the aggregate flow, a model for which Roughgarden and
Tardos [27] bound the price of anarchy in terms of a parameter α that measures the growth rate
of the delay function.
However for the class of heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions, which include
the standard affine functions, we provide bounds on the price of anarchy that are independent
of the network size and the flow requirements. Our results show that the price of anarchy is
bounded by a function of the polynomial size, degree and coefficients. We also discuss lower
bound examples. These results extend previous work on the price of anarchy, more specifically
the results that [27] presents. The existence of Nash Equilibrium for convex heterogeneous
delays follows from the results in [27] which show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium flow in
k-commodity non-atomic networks with convex delay functions.
In summary (also refer to Table 1):
• We generalize the Pigou bound [24, 27] and provide a multi-dimensional version, which is
termed the Gamma-Pigou bound (section 2.1). This bound utilizes an independent term,
defined as the Gamma bound. We show that the price of anarchy of selfish non-atomic
routing in networks with heterogeneous delay functions can be obtained from combining
these bounds.
• We provide examples (section 2.2) to illustrate that the price of anarchy for heterogeneous
functions can become unbounded in the general case.
• We provide a bound on the price of anarchy in networks with k (types of) commodities
where each edge is associated with heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions.
This bound is (amaxkNΦ)
θ+1 in the most general form of the network where NΦ represents
the maximum number of terms in the delay function over all edges (section 2.4). We
note that this bound is independent of the network size but grows with the number of
commodity types and exponentially with respect to θ, the degree of the polynomial. A
similar behavior is exhibited in the case of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay
functions (section 2.3), where the price of anarchy bound is (θ+1)amaxk
θ−1, which becomes
2amax for affine functions.
When we consider networks with heterogeneous affine (i.e., θ = 1) delay functions, the
bound is k2N2Φa
2
max + 2. Note that NΦ is bounded by k + 1. These bounds should be
contrasted with the bound of 4/3 achieved when the delay on the edge is linearly dependent
on the aggregate flow of the commodities on the edge.
The bounds illustrate an exponential growth with the degree of the polynomials and linear
or polynomial growth with the value of amax.
• We provide an example(lemma 2.4) that illustrates the tightness of our bounds. The
example network has a POA of amax(k − 1)θ−1 for large enough value of amax. This
network provides an asymptotically tight bound for affine functions.
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k commodities
PoA
affine θ-complete polynomial
Aggregate 4/3 [27] Θ
(
θ
log θ
)
[24]
2amax (θ + 1)amaxk
θ−1
Decomposable
[Theorem 2.7*] [Theorem 2.7]
k2N2Φa
2
max + 2 (amaxkNΦ)
θ+1
Heterogeneous
[Theorem 2.11] [Theorem 2.9]
Lower Bound [Lemma 2.4]: Ω(amax(k − 1)θ−1)
Table 1: PoA for Nonatomic Flows (* indicates an asymptotically tight bound)
Results for Atomic Network Flows: Our second set of results consider atomic flows. In
the most general setting Nash equilibrium does not exist and thus wherever necessary we will
assume that the instance provided has a Nash equilibrium. Our results for the case of atomic
flows are summarized below (also refer to Table 2).
• We show the existence of Nash equilibrium for uniform heterogeneous affine delay func-
tions. Our proof uses a potential function argument. Further, we show that for non-
uniform heterogeneous functions, where edges have different delay functions, Nash Equi-
librium need not exist (section 3.1). The second result is indeed surprising, especially since
it only requires affine functions and unit demands (unweighted) to generate the examples.
This contrasts with the fact that any unweighted congestion game with homogeneous de-
lays, where the delay is a function of aggregate flows, has a pure Nash equilibrium [23, 16]
• We consider the price of anarchy for atomic flow routing in networks with k (types of)
commodities where each edge is associated with decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay
functions (section 3.2).
When we consider networks with decomposable affine delay functions this bound is amax+2
and thus is dependent on the relative impact of the commodities. This contrasts with the
constant PoA bound of 3+
√
5
2 [4] when the delay function depends only on the aggregate
flow.
In the case of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions, the bound isO(aθ+2maxN
θ+1
Φ ).
The above bounds utilize arguments based on a variational inequality that arises in these
problems and satisfied by any Nash equilibrium solution.
Again, even in this case, the PoA does not depend on the network size but only on
the characteristic of the delay function. However, the relative co-efficients in the delay
function, amax, is a substantial factor. Contrast this with the bound when the delays are
a function of the aggregate flows: the price of anarchy for aggregate delay functions is
Θ(( θlog θ )
θ+1) [3], independent of the relative weights of the types of commodities in the
network or the number of commodities themselves.
Further, for atomic flows in networks with two different types of commodities and uniform delay
functions, i.e., delays defined by a1f1(e) + a2f2(e) + c(e), we show an improved bound on the
price of anarchy (Table 3). This is achieved by considering the cycles that arise when the Nash
equilibrium and social optimum flows are overlaid, canceling common flows. By analyzing the
flow in these cycles, we provide an asymptotically tight bound of
√
amax + 2.
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PoA affine θ-complete polynomial
Aggregate 3+
√
5
2 [4] Θ
(
θ
log θ
)θ+1
[3]
amax + 2 O(a
θ+2
maxN
θ+1
Φ )Decomposable
[Theorem 3.4*] [Theorem 3.5]
Lower Bound [Lemma 3.2]: Ω(amax)
Table 2: PoA for k-commodity Atomic Flows (* indicates an asymptotically tight bound)
PoA uniform decomposable√
amax + 2 amax + 2Affine
[Theorem 3.7*] [Theorem 3.4]
Lower Bound [Lemma 3.6]: Ω(
√
amax)
Table 3: PoA for 2-commodity Atomic Flows
(* indicates an asymptotically tight bound)
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we consider bounds for the price of anarchy for non-atomic networks with de-
composable delay functions. Further, in Section 3 we present our results for atomic flows and
strengthen our results on the price of anarchy for two-commodity network flows with uniform
delay functions in Section 3.3.
2 Part I: The Non-Atomic Case
In this section we consider the case of non-atomic network flow routing games. We consider
heterogeneous functions with polynomial delays.
Our contributions on bounds for the price of anarchy in non-atomic selfish routing problems
have been summarized in Table 1.
For general heterogeneous functions, the price of anarchy is unbounded as will be illustrated
in Section 2.2. As the table shows, we obtain upper bounds on the price of anarchy for heteroge-
neous delays for the interesting cases where the function is decomposable and when we consider
θ-complete polynomial delays.
To show bounds on PoA we will use the following variational inequality characterization [10],
the proof of which is simple and omitted.
Lemma 2.1 Let f be a feasible flow for the non-atomic instance (G,R,Φ). The flow f is a
Nash equilibrium flow if and only if∑
e
∑
i
fi(e)Φ
i
e(f1, . . . , fk) ≤
∑
e
∑
i
fˆi(e)Φ
i
e(f1, . . . , fk)
for every flow fˆ feasible for (G,R,Φ).
2.1 The Gamma-Pigou Bound for the Price of Anarchy
We first establish an approach to determining the upper bounds on the price of anarchy for
multidimensional delay functions. For simplicity we consider decomposable functions. While
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this theory is unrestricted, in that the bounds apply for arbitrary heterogeneous functions also,
analysis indicates that the price of anarchy is unbounded in these cases. To simplify notations,
we use f instead of f(e) when clear from the context.
In the analysis of heterogeneous delay functions the standard Pigou bound arguments, de-
signed for aggregate delay functions, do not apply. We thus consider a multi-dimensional version
of the Pigou bound. Since that bound, by itself, does not suffice, we establish that the price of
anarchy is bounded by the generalized Pigou bound and the Gamma bound, which we describe
in detail below. In the subsequent subsection we analyze these bounds in the context of the
delay functions defined by decomposable θ-complete polynomial functions.
We first describe the multi-dimensional version of the Pigou bound [27] as applied to flow
vectors that represent the k types of commodities.
Definition 1 (Generalized Pigou bound) Let C be a nonempty set of cost functions, each func-
tion defined over Rk+. The Pigou bound α(C) for C is
α(C) = sup
Φ∈C
sup
x,r≥0
γ(C)||r||1Φ(r1, . . . , rk)
β(C) ,
β(C) = γ(C)||x||1Φ(x1, . . . , xk) + (||r||1 − ||x||1)Φ(r1, . . . , rk),
where r = (r1, . . . , rk) and x = (x1, . . . , xk), r, x ∈ Rk+ with the understanding that 0/0 = 1, and
γ(C) = sup
Φ∈C
sup
r,x:||x||1≥||r||1
Φ(r1, . . . , rk)
Φ(x1, . . . , xk)
We split our analysis into two cases: 1)||x||1 < ||r||1 and 2)||x||1 ≥ ||r||1. In the case when
||x||1 < ||r||1, we consider the generalized Pigou bound as described above. However, we will
evaluate the Pigou bound in a restricted setting by using the following mathematical program
(SC):
SC: α(C) = sup
Φ∈C
sup
x,r≥0
γ(C)||r||1Φ(r1, , . . . , rk)
γ(C)||x||1Φ(x1, . . . , xk) + (||r||1 − ||x||1)Φ(r1, . . . , rk)
subject to Φ(x1, . . . , xk) ≤ Φ(r1, . . . , rk)
||x||1 < ||r||1
Note that when Φ(x1, . . . , xk) > Φ(r1, . . . , rk), the value of ||x||1(Φ(x1, . . . , xk) − Φ(r1, . . . , rk))
becomes positive and decreases the value of α(C). Thus w.l.o.g we add the constraint that
Φ(x1, . . . , xk) ≤ Φ(r1, . . . , rk).
For the second case, we will consider the second ratio, termed the Gamma Bound, defined
above and restated in a form that will be used in the proof below:
γ(C) = sup
Φ∈C
sup
r,x:||x||1≥||r||1
Φ(r1, . . . , rk)||r||1 + Φ(r1, . . . , rk)(||x||1 − ||r||1)
Φ(x1, . . . , xk)||x||1
Given flow vectors f and fˆ , we will let E||f(e)||>||fˆ(e)|| be the set of all edges with the property
that ||f(e)||1 > ||fˆ(e)||1.
We are now able to express the price of anarchy in terms of the above Pigou and Gamma
bounds:
Theorem 2.2 (Gamma-Pigou Bound) Let C be a set of decomposable monotonically in-
creasing delay functions. If (G,R,Φ) is an instance of a non-atomic k-commodity network
flow routing game with delay function Φ ∈ C, then the price of anarchy in (G,R,Φ) is at most
max{α(C), γ(C)}.
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Proof: Let fˆ and f be the optimal and Nash equilibrium flow, respectively, for a non-atomic
instance (G,R,Φ) with delay functions in the set C. We let the total cost of flow f be CNE(f).
To prove the theorem we note that:
CSO(fˆ) =
∑
e∈E
Φe(fˆ(e))||fˆ(e)||1
≥ 1
α(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||>||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||>||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))(||fˆ(e)||1 − ||f(e)||1) +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||≤||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||≤||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))(||fˆ(e)||1 − ||f(e)||1)
≥ 1
α(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||>||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||≤||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||>||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))(||fˆ(e)||1 − ||f(e)||1) +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||≤||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))(||fˆ(e)||1 − ||f(e)||1)
≥ 1
α(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||>||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 +
1
γ(C)
∑
e∈E||f ||≤||fˆ ||
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1
≥ min{ 1
α(C) ,
1
γ(C)}
∑
e∈E
Φe(f(e))||f(e)||1 = CNE(f)
max{α(C), γ(C)} .
The first inequality follows from the definition of the Pigou bound applied to each edge in
E||f ||>||fˆ || and the Gamma bound w.r.t. edges in E||f ||≤||fˆ ||. Here we split the edge set into
two cases as mentioned before : E||f ||>||fˆ || and E||f ||≤||fˆ || indicate a set of edges with ||f(e)||1 >
||fˆ(e)||1 and ||f(e)||1 ≤ ||fˆ(e)||1, respectively. The second inequality can be obtained by rear-
ranging terms in the first inequality and the third and the fourth terms in the second inequality
can be combined together and ignored due to the variational inequality characterization pre-
sented in Lemma 2.1. uunionsq
2.2 Price of Anarchy is Unbounded for Heterogeneous Polynomial Delays
In this subsection we show lower bounds on the price of anarchy in non-atomic networks with
heterogeneous polynomial delay functions. It is surprising that even in 2-commodity networks
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with delay functions that are sums of monomials of single variables, the price of anarchy depends
on the demand requirement.
We first consider an example of a 2-commodity network with 2 edges, illustrated in Figure 1.
In this network, the top edge e1 is associated with the delay function Φ
i
e1(f1(e1), f2(e1)) =
aif
θ
1 +f2; the bottom edge e2 is associated with the delay function Φ
i
e2(f1(e2), f2(e2)) = f1+aif
θ
2
where a1, a2 and θ > 1. Demand requirements are defined as r1 = r2 = r (where r ≥ 2). The
worst-case Nash equilibrium flow vector f is achieved when f1(e1) = r and f2(e2) = r and
consequently the cost of Nash Equilibrium, CNE(f) = (a1 + a2)r
θ+1. In contrast the social
optimum flow fˆ can be obtained from f2(e1) = r and f1(e2) = r and the social optimum cost is
CSO(fˆ) = 2r
2.
Note that this bound holds for heterogeneous functions that are also decomposable (by letting
a1 = a2 = a), but does not hold for decomposable θ-complete polynomials, a class for which
upper bounds will be illustrated in Section 2.3.
Lemma 2.3 Let C be a set of polynomial heterogeneous delay functions comprising monomials
of a single variable. There exists a (G,R = (r, r),Φ), an instance of non-atomic 2-commodity
network flow routing game where Φ ∈ C, such that the price of anarchy of 2-commodity flow
routing in (G,R,Φ) is Ω(rθ−1).
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(a) Network (b)Nash Equilibrium (c) Optimum
Figure 1: General Polynomial and Heterogeneous Latency
Our next example network in Figure 2 shows that in fact the inefficiency of equilibrium can be
much worse. In this network, the top edge e is associated with the delay function Φe(f1(e), f2(e)) =
(a) Network (b)Nash Equilibrium (c) Optimum
Figure 2: An example of an unbounded price of anarchy
f1f2 + f
2
2 and the bottom edge h is associated with the delay function Φh(f1(h), f2(h)) =
f1f2 + f
2
1 . Demand requirements are defined as r1 = 1 and r2 = 1. The worst-case Nash
equilibrium flow vector f is achieved when f1(h) = 1 and f2(e) = 1 and consequently the Nash
equilibrium cost CNE(f) = 2. Conversely the social optimum flow fˆ can be obtained from
fˆ1(e) = 1 and fˆ2(h) = 1 and the social optimum flow cost CSO(fˆ) = 0. Therefore, the price of
anarchy is unbounded.
2.3 PoA for k-Commodity Non-atomic Networks: the decomposable θ-complete
polynomial case
We next consider the price of anarchy for k-commodity non-atomic network flow routing games
where each edge is associated with a decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay function. The
11
lower bounds obtained in the previous section used network instances where the polynomial
delay function is not θ-complete. The first example does not satisfy the requirement that all
terms have the same sum of exponents and the second example does not have all the non-cross
terms corresponding to the two flow variables.
As discussed in the introduction, it has been shown that Nash equilibrium flow is equivalent
to a social optimum flow under homogeneous aggregate delay functions. However, generally this
does not hold, and even for affine delay functions, PoA is bounded by 4/3. In this section we
establish an upper bound for the PoA for heterogeneous decomposable θ-complete polynomial
delay functions which, unfortunately, is worse than that for the classical aggregate functions
used in [24, 27].
2.3.1 A Lower Bound on PoA
We consider an example of a k-commodity network, with k edges, illustrated in Figure 3. In
this network, the ith edge ei is associated with the delay function Φei(f1(ei), . . . , fk(ei)) =
fθ1 (ei)+f
θ
2 (ei)+. . .+aif
θ
i (ei)+. . .+f
θ
k (ei). Demand requirements are defined as r1 = . . . = rk = 1.
We let ai = a > 1, ∀i. The worst-case Nash equilibrium (NE) flow vector f is achieved when
fj(ej) = 1, when 1 ≤ j ≤ k and consequently the NE cost CNE(f) = ak. Conversely the social
optimum flow fˆ can be obtained by letting fˆ`(ej) = 1/(k − 1) when ` 6= j, 1 ≤ `, j ≤ k for a
large enough value of a and the social optimum has cost CSO(fˆ) = k/(k − 1)θ−1. Let amax be
as defined in Section 1.1. Then we have:
Lemma 2.4 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions. There exists
a (G,R,Φ), an instance of a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game where Φ ∈ C,
such that the price of anarchy of flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is Ω(amax(k − 1)θ−1).
(a) Network (b)Nash Equilibrium (c) Optimum
Figure 3: Decomposable θ-complete Polynomial Latency
2.3.2 POA in k-commodity non-atomic flow networks with a polynomial decom-
posable delay function
In this subsection we consider network instances where the delay function of each path is in the
class of decomposable θ-complete polynomial functions. We let Φe(f) =
∑
` g`f
θ`1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k +c(e)
where
∑j=k
j=1 θ
`
j = θ and which, by the assumptions of θ-complete polynomials, includes the terms∑
i aif
θ
i , ai ∈ R++.
In order to prove the price of anarchy we consider two cases depending on the relationship
between ||f ||1 and ||fˆ ||1, where f and fˆ are the Nash and optimum delay flows. First we consider
the case when ||f ||1 ≤ ||fˆ ||1 on edge e, for which we determine the Gamma bound. We will then
find the Pigou bound for the converse inequality.
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Lemma 2.5 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions for non-
atomic k-commodity network flow routing games. Then, γ(C) ≤ amaxkθ−1.
Proof: For the case when f1 + . . . + fk ≤ fˆ1 + . . . + fˆk on edge e, w.l.o.g we minimize the
social optimum delay by considering ||fˆ ||1 = ||f ||1. This can be achieved by reducing the flow
on each of the dimensions. By monotonicity, Φe(fˆ) decreases. For the remainder, we omit the
dependency on e for simplicity. Let r = f and x = fˆ . then
γ(C) = Φ(f1, . . . , fk)
Φ(fˆ1, . . . , fˆk)
(1)
≤
∑
` g`f
θ`1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k + c
a1fˆθ1 + . . .+ akfˆ
θ
k + c
(2)
≤ max` g`
mini ai
fθ1 + . . .+ f
θ
k + f
θ1
1 f
θ2
2 · · · fθkk + . . .
fˆθ1 + . . .+ fˆ
θ
k
(3)
<
max` g`
mini ai
fθ1 + . . .+ f
θ
k + f
θ1
1 f
θ2
2 · · · fθkk + . . .
k((f1 + . . .+ fk)/k)θ
(4)
≤ max` g`
mini ai
kθ−1
fθ1 + . . .+ f
θ
k + f
θ1
1 f
θ2
2 · · · fθkk + . . .
(f1 + . . .+ fk)θ
(5)
≤ amaxkθ−1 (f1 + . . .+ fk)
θ
(f1 + . . .+ fk)θ
(6)
≤ amaxkθ−1 (7)
In inequality (2), ` represents `-th term in the delay function Φ() and θ1 + . . . + θk = θ since
the delay function is a decomposable θ-complete polynomial. To minimize the divisor we use
only the sum of monomials,
∑
i aif
θ
j , contained in Φ(f1, . . . , fk). This term is lower bounded by
mini ai(fˆ
θ
1 + . . .+ fˆ
θ
k ). Since fˆ1 + . . .+ fˆk = ||f ||1 the minimum value of the divisor is achieved
when fˆ1 = . . . = fˆk > ||f ||1/k. Finally, (7) can be obtained. uunionsq
Now let us evaluate the Pigou bound for the case when ||f ||1 > ||fˆ ||1 on an edge e.
Lemma 2.6 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions for non-
atomic k-commodity network flow routing games. Then, α(C) ≤ (θ + 1)γ(C).
Proof: We consider the value of the Pigou bound and fixing flow f , find a bound on the infimum
of the denominator, β(C), that occurs in the expression for α(C). We let r = f and x = fˆ and
determine inf fˆ β(C) in terms of the vector f . Again we omit the dependency on e.
Given a requirement vector R we find a lower bound on β(C) as described above. The
function β(C) is convex and thus by KKT conditions w.l.o.g assume that fˆi > 0 and ∂β(C)∂fˆi = 0,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k′}, where |{i ∈ K|fˆi > 0}| = k′. Note thus that by the equations, ∂β(C)∂fˆi = 0 for
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k′, we obtain
γ(C)||fˆ ||1∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
− Φ(f) + γ(C)Φ(fˆ) = 0
which can be written as
γ(C)||fˆ ||1∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
= Φ(f)− γ(C)Φ(fˆ).
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Multiplying the above with fˆi gives that
γ(C)||fˆ ||1fˆi∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
= fˆi(Φ(f)− γ(C)Φ(fˆ)).
and summing over all 1 ≤ i ≤ k′,
γ(C)
k′∑
i=1
||fˆ ||1fˆi∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
=
k′∑
i=1
fˆi(Φ(f)− γ(C)Φ(fˆ))
which is equivalent to
γ(C)||fˆ ||1
k′∑
i=1
fˆi
∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
= ||fˆ ||1(Φ(f)− γ(C)Φ(fˆ)).
Since θ is the maximum degree and positive and all terms in ∂Φ(fˆ)
∂fˆi
are nonnegative as all co-
efficients are nonnegative (by definition) and fˆ has nonnegative components,
θΦ(fˆ) ≥
k′∑
i=1
fˆi∂Φ(fˆ)/∂fˆi
and thus
γ(C)||fˆ ||1θΦ(fˆ) ≥ ||fˆ ||1(Φ(f)− γ(C)Φ(fˆ)).
By eliminating ||fˆ ||1 on both sides,
γ(C)(θ + 1)Φ(fˆ) ≥ Φ(f). (8)
Further,
β(C) = γ(C)||fˆ ||1Φ(fˆ) + (||f ||1 − ||fˆ ||1)Φ(f) (9)
≥ ||f ||1Φ(f) + ||fˆ ||1Φ(f) γ(C)
(θ + 1)γ(C) − ||fˆ ||1Φ(f) (10)
= ||f ||1Φ(f) + ||fˆ ||1−θΦ(f)
θ + 1
(11)
≥ ||f ||1Φ(f) + ||f ||1−θΦ(f)
θ + 1
(12)
= ||f ||1(Φ(f)− θ
θ + 1
Φ(f)) (13)
=⇒ β(C) ≥ 1
θ + 1
||f ||1Φ(f) (14)
Thus,
α(C) ≤ γ(C)||f ||1Φ(f)
γ(C)||fˆ ||1Φ(fˆ) + (||f ||1 − ||fˆ ||1)Φ(f)
(15)
=
γ(C)||f ||1Φ(f)
β(C) (16)
≤ γ(C)||f ||1Φ(f)||f ||1Φ(f)
θ+1
(17)
= (θ + 1)γ(C) (18)
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uunionsq
Combining the above two bounds and using Theorem 2.2 we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2.7 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions. Let
(G,R,Φ) be a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game instance with delay func-
tion Φ ∈ C. The price of anarchy of flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is at most (θ + 1)amaxkθ−1
2.4 POA in k-commodities non-atomic heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial
delay functions
In this section we show bounds on the price of anarchy in k-commodity non-atomic networks
for heterogeneous affine and polynomial delay functions. The bound will be a function of the
number of commodities k and NΦ, the maximum number of terms in the polynomial representing
Φie(f) over all edges, e, and commodities, i. Interestingly, there is no dependence on the size of
the network.
Before proving the result we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.8 Let f be a Nash equilibrium flow and fˆ be a social optimum flow vector in a non-
atomic k-commodity flow routing game instance with heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay
functions. Then
CNE(f) ≤ kNΦamax(CNE(f))
θ
θ+1 (CSO(fˆ))
1
θ+1 + CSO(fˆ)
Proof: We use the variational inequality defined in Lemma 2.1(also see [10]). The delay function
may have two categories of terms : i) summation of all terms that consists of one variable and
ii) summation of all terms that consists of at least two variables (referred to as cross terms). Let
us first consider the part of the delay function that comprises terms of category (i). To simplify
the presentation we first consider one such term in Φie(f), i.e., the generic term ai`(e)f
θ
` (e). A
bound on the contribution of the term to the delay is provided below:∑
e
fˆi(e)(ai`(e)f
θ
` (e)) ≤ amax
∑
e
fˆi(e)(f
θ
` (e))
≤ amax(
∑
e
fˆθ+1i (e))
1
θ+1 (
∑
e
(fθ` (e))
θ+1
θ )
θ
θ+1
≤ amaxCSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1 × (
∑
e
(fθ` (e))
1
θ (Φ`e(f)))
θ
θ+1
≤ amaxCSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1 × (
∑
e
(f`(e))(Φ
`
e(f)))
θ
θ+1
≤ amaxCSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1CNE(f)
θ
θ+1
The term on the LHS in the first inequality arises on the RHS of the variational inequality. The
first inequality holds since amax is the largest coefficient over all aij . The second inequality can
be obtained by applying Ho¨lder’s inequality. The third inequality is true since ∀l, fθ` (e) ≤ Φ`e(f),
given the assumption that all co-efficients of the polynomial Φ`e(f) have value greater than or
equal to one. Finally, the last inequality follows since
∑
e(f`(e))(Φ
`
e(f)) ≤ CNE(f).
For the second case, note that for any cross term the following is true: fθ11 (e)f
θ2
2 (e) · · · fθkk (e) ≤
max(fθ1 (e), . . . , f
θ
k (e)) where θ1 +. . .+θk = θ in the second case. The `-th term in the delay func-
tion for commodity i satisfies gi`(e)f
θ`1
1 (e)f
θ`2
2 (e) · · · f
θ`k
k (e) ≤ gi`(e) max(fθ1 (e), . . . , fθk (e)). The
subsequent bound in this case is obtained similarly to the first case. Based on these two cases,
we know that any term in Φie(f) has the same upper bound, i.e., amaxCSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1CNE(f)
θ
θ+1 .
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Note that we have at most NΦ terms in Φ
i
e(f) for each of the k commodities. The bound in the
lemma follows, since
CNE(f) =
∑
i
∑
e
fi(e)Φ
i
e(f)
=
∑
i∈K
∑
e∈E
fi(e)
∑
j
aij(e)f
θ
j +
∑
1≤`≤Lie
gi`(e)f
θ`1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k + ci(e)

≤
∑
i
∑
e
fˆi(e)
∑
j
aij(e)f
θ
j +
∑
1≤`≤Lie
gi`(e)f
θ`1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k
+∑
i
∑
e
fˆi(e)ci(e)
≤ kNΦamax(CNE(f))
θ
θ+1 (CSO(fˆ))
1
θ+1 + CSO(fˆ)
where the last inequality follows because
∑
i
∑
e fˆi(e)ci(e) ≤
∑
i
∑
e fˆi(e)Φ
i
e(fˆ) = CSO(fˆ). uunionsq
We use the above lemma to prove the following result:
Theorem 2.9 Let C be a set of heterogeneous θ-complete polynomial delay functions. If (G,R,Φ)
is a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game instance with delay functions in C, then
the price of anarchy of routing flow in (G,R,Φ) is at most (amaxkNΦ + 1)
θ+1.
Proof: Due to Lemma 2.8,
CNE(f) ≤ kNΦamax (CNE(f))
θ
θ+1
(
CSO(fˆ)
) 1
θ+1
+ CSO(fˆ)
where f is the Nash equilibrium flow and fˆ the social optimum flow. Thus,(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)
≤ kNΦamax
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
) θ
θ+1
+ 1.
Since (CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)
θ
θ+1 ≥ 1,
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)
≤ (kNΦamax + 1)
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
) θ
θ+1
Thus PoA ≤ (amaxkNΦ + 1)θ+1. uunionsq
2.5 k-commodity non-atomic - heterogeneous affine delay functions
We determine a bound on the price of anarchy in k-commodity non-atomic networks with het-
erogeneous affine delay functions. From Lemma 2.8, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2.10 Let f and fˆ be a Nash equilibrium flow and a social optimum flow vector, re-
spectively, in a non-atomic k-commodity network flow routing game instance with heterogeneous
affine delay functions. Then
CNE(f) ≤ kNΦamax
(
CNE(f)CSO(fˆ)
)1/2
+ CSO(fˆ).
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Also, in a fashion similar to Theorem 2.9, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.11 Let C be a set of heterogeneous affine functions. If (G,R,Φ) is a k-commodity
non-atomic network flow routing game instance with delay function in C, then the price of
anarchy of routing flow in (G,R,Φ) is at most k2N2Φa
2
max + 2.
Proof: Using Corollary 2.10(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)
≤ (kNΦamax)
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
) 1
2
+ 1
The result follows from determining an upper bound on x such that x2 − kNΦamaxx − 1 ≤ 0
where x2 = CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
.
uunionsq
3 Part II - PoA for Atomic Flows
In this section we consider atomic flows. We start with some negative results on the existence of
Nash equilibrium. In general, Nash equilibrium does not exist, even for affine functions, as shown
in Section 3.1. Note that this is somewhat surprising since it is well known that a congestion
game with delay that is a function of aggregate load, or flow, has at least one pure Nash
equilibrium [23, 16]. A positive outlook does exist: we show that Nash equilibrium exists when
the heterogeneous delay functions are affine and uniform over the network. Our contributions
for the price of anarchy in atomic selfish routing problems have been illustrated in Table 2. For
2-commodity networks with uniform affine delay functions, we show (also see Table 3) improved
bounds which are different from the bounds on general decomposable affine delay functions.
The bound provided (Theorem 3.7) is an asymptotically tight bound as illustrated by the lower
bound of Ω(
√
amax).
3.1 Existence of Atomic NE flow?
We first show that pure Nash equilibrium does not exist in the case of atomic, decomposable
and affine delay functions with unweighted demand requirement. In Figure 4, there are two
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Figure 4: Affine and Decomposable Latency
users with r1 = r2 = 1(also termed unweighted) and the users have the same set of strategies
(paths) from source s to destination t. The delay function associated with an edge is shown in
Figure 4. Let us define four paths P1 = {(s, t)}, P2 = {(s, u), (u, t)}, P3 = {(s, u), (u, v), (v, t)}
and P4 = {(s, v), (v, t)}. Since the coefficient of the delay for user 2 is very large for the edges
in P1 and P3, user 2 will not utilize these paths. Thus, there are a total of eight pairs of
paths each of which are chosen by user 1 and user 2, respectively as shown in Table 4. The
strategies of the two users will be represented by the pair of strategies (P, P ′) where P and P ′
17
path delay
Strategy Pair
user 1 user 2 user 1 user 2
(P3, P2) P3 P2 9 23
(P3, P4) P3 P4 15 22
(P1, P4) P1 P4 12 21
(P1, P2) P1 P2 12 20
(P4, P2) P4 P2 10 20
(P2, P4) P2 P4 17 21
(P2, P2) P2 P2 25 25
(P4, P4) P4 P4 24 24
Table 4: Non-existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium
belong to the set of 4 paths {P1, P2, P3, P4). There exists a sequence of strategy pairs that cycle
{(P3, P2), (P3, P4), (P1, P4), (P1, P2)}. Further, other strategies are not stable. Strategy pairs
(P4, P2) and (P2, P2) will shift to the strategy pair (P3, P2) because P3 is more beneficial to user
1. And lastly, strategy pairs (P2, P4) and (P4, P4) are unstable since the strategy pair (P3, P4)
is preferred by user 1. This example shows that there may be no pure Nash equilibrium in
2-commodity atomic networks where each edge is associated with an affine, decomposable delay
function and each user has a requirement of one unit of demand (a case usually referred to as
unweighted).
However, in atomic networks when each edge is associated with an affine, uniform delay
function, we show that there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium. This proof applies to
both unweighted and weighted demands and is based on the existence of a potential function.
Theorem 3.1 Let C be a set of affine, uniform delay functions. If (G,R,Φ) is a k-commodity
atomic network flow routing game instance with delay functions in C, then (G,R,Φ) admits at
least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We start with considering delay functions of the form
∑
i ai(e)fi(e)+c(e). Let us define a
potential function Ψ(f) =
∑
e(d
2(e) +
∑
j∈S(e)(aj(e)rj(e))
2) where d(e) =
∑k
i=1 ai(e)ri(e) + c(e)
for every feasible flow f and S(e) represents the set commodities utilizing edge e. We claim
that a global minimum f of the potential function Ψ is also an equilibrium flow for (G,R,Φ).
Let Pi be the path used by commodity i in the solution that minimizes Ψ(f). Assume, for
a contradiction, that shifting from path Pi to path P¯i by user i, creating the flow f¯ , strictly
decreases its delay. In other words,
∆(f, f¯) = ΦP¯i(f¯)− ΦPi(f)
=
∑
e∈P¯i\Pi
Φe(. . . , f¯i(e) = ri, . . .)−
∑
e∈Pi\P¯i
Φe(f1(e), . . . , fi(e) = ri, . . . fk(e)) < 0.
On the other hand, let us consider the potential function Ψ as user i deviates. For any edge e¯ in
P¯i \Pi, we gain (d(e¯) + ai(e¯)ri(e¯))2 + a2i (e¯)r2i (e¯)− d2(e¯) = 2d(e¯)ai(e¯)ri(e¯) + 2a2i (e¯)r2i (e¯). For any
edge e in Pi \ P¯i, we have a change of d2(e)− ((d(e)−ai(e)ri(e))2−a2i (e)r2i (e)) = 2d(e)ai(e)ri(e).
Thus,
Ψ(f¯)−Ψ(f) =
∑
e¯
(2d(e¯)ai(e¯)ri(e¯) + 2a
2
i (e¯)r
2
i (e¯))−
∑
e
2d(e)ai(e)ri(e)
= 2airi(
∑
e¯
(d(e¯) + airi)−
∑
e
d(e))
= 2airi(ΦP¯i(f¯)− ΦPi(f))
= 2airi∆(f, f¯)
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The first equality holds due to the definition of potential function Ψ. Since we consider affine,
uniform delay functions, ai(e¯) = ai(e) = ai and this results in the second equality. Note that
the third equality is satisfied because airi is the exact amount of delay increase after the user i
deviation. Since the delay decreases after user i deviates, ∆(f, f¯) is negative. Further, ai, ri > 0,
and thus the potential function value at f¯ is strictly less than the potential value at f , which
contradicts that f is a global minimum. uunionsq
3.2 k-commodity atomic decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay func-
tions
In this section we provide bounds on the price of anarchy in k-commodity network flows with
decomposable delay functions.
3.2.1 A Lower Bound on PoA
We show an example network in Figure 5. In this network, the top edge e is associated with the
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Figure 5: Affine and Decomposable Latency
delay function Φe(f1(e), f2(e)) = f1 + af2 and the bottom edge h is associated with the delay
function Φh(f1(h), f2(h)) = af1 + f2. Demand requirements are defined as r1 = 1 and r2 = 1.
The worst-case Nash equilibrium flow vector f is achieved when f1(h) = 1 and f2(e) = 1 and
consequently the Nash equilibrium cost CNE(f) = 2a. Conversely the social optimum flow fˆ
can be obtained from fˆ1(e) = 1 and fˆ2(h) = 1 and the social optimum cost CSO(fˆ) = 2.
Lemma 3.2 Let C be a set of affine decomposable delay functions. There exists (G,R,Φ), an
atomic two-commodity network flow routing game instance where Φ ∈ C, such that the price of
anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is Ω(amax) when amax ≥ 2.
Note that when amax = 1, i.e. in the aggregate model where all co-efficients are the same, an
example with 4 players has been shown where the price of anarchy is 1 + φ ≈ 2.618 [4].
3.2.2 An Upper Bound on PoA
In this section we provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy for k-commodity network
atomic flows. We first consider affine delay functions, i.e., delay functions of the form Φi(e) =∑
j aj(e)fj(e) + c(e). We use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to prove the following:
Lemma 3.3 Let C be a set of affine decomposable delay functions. Let f and fˆ be a Nash
equilibrium and a social optimum atomic flow, respectively, in a k-commodity network flow
routing game with delays in the class C. Then
CNE(f) ≤ (CSO(fˆ))1/2√amax(CNE(f))1/2 + CSO(fˆ).
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Proof: Let f and fˆ be a Nash equilibrium flow and a social optimum flow, respectively for this
instance. Let Pi and Pˆi be paths, utilized by commodity i, in the Nash equilibrium (NE) and
the social optimum solution, respectively. Then by the fact that Pi is used at the NE solution,∑
e∈Pi
(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e) + c(e)) ≤
∑
e∈Pˆi
(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e) + c(e) + ai(e)ri).
The inequality above holds due to the variational inequality. By multiplying both sides of the
above inequality by ri and summing over all commodities, we have the following.∑
i
ri
∑
e∈Pi
(a1(e)f1(e)+. . .+ak(e)fk(e)+c(e)) ≤
∑
i
ri
∑
e∈Pˆi
(a1(e)f1(e)+. . .+ak(e)fk(e)+c(e)+ai(e)ri)
or equivalently, on summing over all edges instead of paths, using fi(e) = ri and interchanging
the order of the summations, we get∑
e∈∪iPi
||f(e)||1(a1(e)f1(e)+. . .+ak(e)fk(e)+c(e)) ≤
∑
e∈∪iPˆi
||fˆ(e)||1(a1(e)f1(e)+. . .+ak(e)fk(e)+c(e))
+
∑
i
∑
e∈Pˆi
ai(e)fˆi
2
.
Then, cost at Nash equilibrium is bounded above as follows:
CNE(f) ≤
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e)) +
∑
e
(||fˆ(e)||1c(e) +
∑
i
fˆ2i (e)ai(e))
≤
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e)) +
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1
∑
i
(ai(e)fˆi(e) + c(e))
≤ (
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||21)1/2(
∑
e
(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e))
2)1/2 +∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1
∑
i
(ai(e)fˆi(e) + c(e))
≤
√
(
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||21)(maxi,e ai(e))
∑
e
(f1(e) + . . .+ fk(e))(a1(e)f1(e) + . . .+ ak(e)fk(e))
+
∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1
∑
i
(ai(e)fˆi(e) + c(e))
≤ (CSO(fˆ))1/2
√
max
i,e
ai(e)CNE(f) + CSO(fˆ)
The third inequality can be obtained by utilizing the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. The last
inequality depends on the co-efficients of the affine function being greater than or equal to one.
uunionsq
Using the above lemma we can determine the price of anarchy for the set of affine decomposable
delay functions.
Theorem 3.4 Let C be a set of affine, decomposable delay functions. If (G,R,Φ) is a k-
commodity atomic network flow routing game instance with the delay function Φ in C, then the
price of anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is at most amax + 2 where amax represents
the maximum coefficient in the affine delay function.
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Proof: From Lemma 3.3
CNE(f)− a1/2max
(
CNE(f)CSO(fˆ)
)1/2 − CSO(fˆ) ≤ 0,
and dividing by CSO(fˆ) gives(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)
− a1/2max
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)1/2
− 1 ≤ 0
Then, we obtain a quadratic equation x2 − a1/2maxx − 1 ≤ 0 where x =
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
)1/2
which leads
to PoA =
(
(amax+4)1/2+(amax)1/2
2
)2
= amax+(a
2
max+4amax)
1/2
2 + 1 ≤ amax + 2. uunionsq
We can extend the above proof to find an upper bound on the price of anarchy in k-commodity
atomic networks with decomposable polynomial delay functions.
Theorem 3.5 Let C be a set of decomposable θ-complete polynomial delay functions. If (G,R,Φ)
is a k-commodity atomic network flow routing game instance with the delay function Φ in C,
then the price of anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is O(aθ+2maxN
θ+1
Φ )
Proof: Using the variational inequality applicable in the case of atomic flow routing, we get,
for the ith commodity: ∑
e∈Pi
Φe(fe) ≤
∑
e∈P ′i
Φe(fˆe) (19)
where f is the Nash equilibrium flow and fˆ is the flow function with the ith commodity using
P ′i instead of Pi to route ri units of flow. The introduction of the ith commodity to edges in
the path P ′i adds a number of terms to the delay. Consider the following sum of delay terms on
edge e when fˆi(e) is nonzero. ∑
1≤`≤Lie
g`(e)fˆ
θ`1
1 fˆ
θ`2
2 · · · fˆ
θ`k
k
where fˆj(e) = fj(e), j 6= i is nonzero and fˆi(e) = ri. Consider one such term T = g`(e)fθ
`
1
1 f
θ`2
2 · · · f
θ`k
k .
If i = arg maxj:e∈Pj rj then T ≤ g`(e)rθi (note that ri ∈ N). Alternatively, T ≤ g`(e)fθm where
m = arg maxj:e∈Pj rj . In both cases, T ≤ amaxΦe(f). A similar analysis holds for the terms
introduced by the ith commodity in the delay of other commodities. Since there are NΦ terms
in the delay function, we get:
Φe(fˆ) ≤ amaxNΦΦe(f) + amaxNΦrθi (20)
Multiplying both sides of Equation (19) by ri, applying Equation (20) and summing over all
commodities and edges we get:
CNE(f) ≤ amaxNΦ
[∑
e
||fˆ(e)||1Φe(f) +
∑
e
∑
i
fˆi(e)
θ+1
]
≤ amaxNΦ
[
(
∑
e
(||fˆ(e)||1)θ+1)
1
θ+1 (
∑
e
Φe(f)
θ+1
θ )
θ
θ+1 +
∑
e
∑
i
fˆi(e)
θ+1
]
≤ amaxNΦ
[
CSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1 · (a
1
θ
max
∑
e
||f(e)||1Φe(f))
θ
θ+1 + CSO(fˆ)
]
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since ∑
e
Φe(f)
θ+1
θ ≤
∑
e
(
amax(||f(e)||1)θΦe(f)θ
)1/θ
.
Thus
CNE(f) ≤ amaxNΦ
[
CSO(fˆ)
1
θ+1 · (a
1
θ
maxCNE)
θ
θ+1
]
+ CSO(fˆ)
or equivalently
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ a
θ+2
θ+1
maxNΦ
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
) θ
θ+1
+ 1
≤ (a
θ+2
θ+1
maxNΦ + 1)
(
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
) θ
θ+1
The bound on the price of anarchy is thus O(aθ+2maxN
θ+1
Φ ). uunionsq
3.3 Improved PoA for Affine Delays
In this subsection we provide improved bounds for atomic flows when the delay function is affine
and uniform modulo differences in the constant term, i.e., Φ(e) =
∑
i aifi(e) + c(e).
3.3.1 Lower Bounds on PoA for Uniform Delay Functions
In fact, even for the class of affine functions that does not have a constant term, we provide
an example (Figure 6) which shows that the PoA is Ω(
√
a). In this example the delay function
associated with the edges is af1 + f2 + af3. The requirements are r1 = r3 = 1 and r2 =
√
a.
The Nash equilibrium solution has flow f1 = 1 and f2 =
√
a on the top edge. It has flow f3 = 1
!"1 + "2 + !"3	
!"1 + "2 + !"3	
(1, √!, 0)	
(0,0,1)	
,0, √!, 0-	
(1,0,1)	 	
(a) Network (b)Nash Equilibrium (c) Optimum
Figure 6: Uniform and affine latency
on the bottom edge with cost CNE(f) = a
√
a+ 3a+
√
a. The optimum flow solution is fˆ1 and
fˆ3 on the bottom edge and fˆ2 on the top edge with CSO(fˆ) = 5a. Thus POA = Ω(
√
a).
For functions of the form af1 + f2 + c(e) with a ≥ 1 and c(e) a nonnegative constant, we
provide a similar example that shows a PoA that is Ω(
√
a). In this network, the top edge e
is associated with the delay function Φe(f1(e), f2(e)) = af1 + f2 + a and the bottom edge h is
associated with the delay function Φh(f1(h), f2(h)) = af1+f2. Demand requirements are defined
as r1 = 1 and r2 = (a)
1/2. The Nash equilibrium(NE) flow vector f has the flow f1(h) = 1 and
f2(e) = (a)
1/2 and consequently the cost of NE, CNE(f) = a((a)
1/2 + 2). Conversely the social
optimum flow fˆ can be obtained from fˆ1(e) = 1 and fˆ2(h) = (a)
1/2 and the social optimum cost
CSO(fˆ) = 3a. The price of anarchy is thus
a((a)1/2+2)
3a =
(a)1/2+2
3 .
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(a) Network (b)Nash Equilibrium (c) Optimum
Figure 7: Uniform and affine latency
Lemma 3.6 Let C be a set of affine delay functions that are uniform (modulo differences in the
constant term). There exists (G,R,Φ), an atomic 2-commodity network flow network routing
game instance where Φ ∈ C, such that the price of anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G,R,Φ)
is at least (amax)
1/2+2
3 , i.e., Ω(
√
amax).
We also show an almost matching upper bound in the following.
3.3.2 Almost tight upper bound for Uniform Functions
Theorem 3.7 Let C be a set of affine delay functions that are uniform up to differences in the
constant term. If (G,R,Φ) is an atomic 2-commodity network flow routing game instance with
delay functions in C, then the price of anarchy of atomic flow routing in (G,R,Φ) is at most√
amax + 2 and this is almost tight as shown in Lemma 3.6.
The proof of Theorem 3.7 is shown below. Recall that the theorem claims that if (G,R,Φ) is
an atomic 2-commodity instance with uniform affine delay functions, then the price of anarchy
of (G,R,Φ) is at most
√
amax + 2.
Proof Outline: The proof proceeds by comparing both the Nash equilibrium solution and the
optimum solution. Removing the common flows between the two, a set of cycles are obtained
such that by reversing flow on these cycles, one flow can be transformed to the other. The price
of anarchy is obtained using the structure of these cycles. We show that we can obtain the PoA
by considering one cycle only and analyzing the worst case behavior depending on how the two,
the Nash equilibrium and the optimum flows, utilize the edges of the cycle. The analysis is by
cases; we obtain sixteen possibilities but three cases dominate all other cases and thus we provide
an upper bound of the PoA for these three cases. The analysis uses variational inequalities to
determine the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and optimum flow.
Reducing to Cycles: Consider F⊗ = (F−Fˆ )⋃(Fˆ−F ) where F and Fˆ are a Nash equilibrium
flow and a social optimum flow, respectively. Further we let F1 and F2 denote the sub-flows
of F at a Nash equilibrium flow for commodity 1 and commodity 2, respectively. Similarly, we
let Fˆ1 and Fˆ2 denote the social optimum flow for commodity 1 and commodity 2, respectively.
Note that
⊗
cancels common flows in F and Fˆ . In the figures below that illustrate the various
cases, we let edges in F1
⊗
Fˆ1 be thicker and edges in F2
⊗
Fˆ2 be thinner lines.
By reversing the flow in Fˆ and partitioning F1
⊗
Fˆ1 and F2
⊗
Fˆ2, respectively, we obtain a
set of cycles for commodity 1 and commodity 2. We let the cycles represented by thicker lines
be denoted by CC1 for commodity 1 and cycles represented by the thinner lines by CC2 for
commodity 2. Note that an edge could be utilized by commodity 1 as well as commodity 2, and
it can occur in cycles of both commodities.
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Analyzing PoA bounds for Cycles: We need a lemma which show that there exists a good
partition of the cycles so that we can obtain an almost tight upper bound. Let (ai, bi) be a
collection of pairs where 1 ≤ i ≤ d : ai, bi ∈ R+. Let Π be a set of partitions of I = {1, . . . , d}
such that
• If pi = (pi1, . . . , pi`) ∈ Π then |pij | ≤ 2,
Note the following are true
• If pi = (pi1, . . . , pi`) ∈ Π then ⋃j pij = I,
• If pij1 , pij2 ∈ pi and pij1 6= pij2 then pij1 ⋂pij2 = ∅.
Lemma 3.8 Let pˆi ∈ Π be an optimum partition of I defined as
pˆi = arg min
pi∈Π
max
pij∈pi
∑
`∈pi a`∑
`∈pi b`
where pi = (pi1, . . . , piq) and pij corresponds to the j-th part and is a subset (of at most 2 elements)
of I of size tj, i.e., pi
j = {x1, . . . , xtj}. Then
a1 + a2 + . . .+ ad
b1 + b2 + . . .+ bd
≤ max
pˆij∈pˆi
∑
`∈pˆij a`∑
`∈pˆij b`
.
We next show that PoA can be estimated by considering at most one cycle per commodity
instead of all cycles. Throughout this subsection, let a = a1/a2 where a1 and a2 represent
coefficients of commodity 1 and commodity 2 in the affine uniform delay function.
Let CC be the set of all cycles and Π be a set of partitions of CC. Consider a partition p¯i
of CC where each part is of size either 1 or of size 2 (in which case it contains 1 cycle from
each commodity, C1 ∈ CC1 and C2 ∈ CC2). Let the pair (f1, f2) and (fˆ1, fˆ2) be the Nash
equilibrium flow of commodity 1 and commodity 2 and the social optimum flow of commodity
1 and commodity 2, respectively. Let pˆi = {pˆi1, . . . , pˆiq} be a partition which guarantees the
optimum amongst partitions in Π. Then,
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
=
∑
e∈E(f1(e) + f2(e))Φ(f1(e), f2(e))∑
e∈E(fˆ1(e) + fˆ2(e))Φ(fˆ1(e), fˆ2(e))
≤ max
pˆij∈pˆi
(
cost of NE flow in cycles or combinations of cycles in pˆij
cost of SO flow in cycles or combinations of cycles in pˆij
)
≤ max
p¯ij∈p¯i
(
cost of NE flow in cycles or combinations of cycles in p¯ij
cost of SO flow in cycles or combinations of cycles in p¯ij
)
≤ max {
max
p¯ij=(C1,C2)
f1ΦC1(f1, f2) + f2ΦC2(f1, f2)
fˆ1ΦC1(fˆ1, fˆ2) + fˆ2ΦC2(fˆ1, fˆ2)
,
max
p¯ij=(C1)
f1ΦC1(f1, f2)
fˆ1ΦC1(fˆ1, fˆ2)
,
max
p¯ij=(C2)
f2ΦC2(f1, f2)
fˆ2ΦC2(fˆ1, fˆ2)
}
where ΦC1() and ΦC2() represent cost incurred in C
1 and C2, respectively. The first inequality
holds due to Lemma 3.8. In the last inequality, we have |p¯ij | = 2 for the first factor and |p¯ij | = 1
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for the second and third factors. In Lemma 3.8, we showed that the maximum cost element in
pˆi provides an upper bound for CNE(f)/CSO(fˆ). So, the partition p¯i considered here provides
an upper bound for CNE(f)/CSO(fˆ). Later we will show that this partition is good enough to
obtain an almost tight bound for CNE(f)/CSO(fˆ).
To analyze the price of anarchy, we consider the structure of the cycles.
Cycle Structure: In this subsection we consider the structure of the cycles obtained in F
⊗
Fˆ .
One type of cycle obtained is illustrated in Figure 8. Here u and v are starting and end nodes such
that reversing of fˆ1 leads to a cycle. Though there are cycles for commodity 1 and commodity 2,
we consider cycles for commodity 1. We consider flow from commodity 1 as a primary flow and
flow from commodity 2 as a secondary flow, respectively. The case when flow from commodity 2
is a primary flow is symmetric to this case. Note that though we consider cycles from commodity
1, it is possible that those might be intersected with cycles from commodity 2. We show an
example of a cycle from commodity 1 intersecting with a flow of commodity 2 in Figure 8. In
Figure 8: An example of a cycle from commodity 1
the figure, the thinner and solid line represent f2; while the thinner and dashed lines represent
fˆ2. As shown in Figure 8, f2 and fˆ2 intersect with a cycle of commodity 1 and also f2 and fˆ2
can overlap each other.
Depending on how the NE flow and social optimum flow use the top and bottom path in the
cycle, we have sixteen possibilities. We show that three cases dominate all other cases and thus
we provide an upper bound of the PoA for these three cases.
Notation: As shown in Figure 8, we have two paths, termed as top path and bottom path.
Throughout this section, let ΦPi(f1, f2) be cost of path Pi when flow on path P of commodity 1 is
f1 and that on path P of commodity 2 is f2. We define Φ
′
Pi
(f1, f2) as the cost when restricted to
a subset of edges P ′ ⊆ Pi, which is utilized by both f1 and f2. Similarly for P ′′ ⊆ P let Φ′′Pi(f1, 0)
(or Φ′′Pi(0, f2)) be defined as the cost function over a set of edges P
′′ which is utilized by f1 (or
f2), but not both. Note that P
′⋂P ′′ = ∅. For simplicity, we define ΦPi(f1, f2) = Φi(f1, f2),
Φ′Pi(f1, f2) = Φ
′
i(f1, f2), Φ
′′
Pi
(f1, 0) = Φ
′′
i (f1, 0) and Φ
′′
Pi
(0, f2) = Φ
′′
i (0, f2).
Also, throughout this subsection we let P1, P2 correspond to edges containing flows of both
commodities in the top path and the bottom path from u1 to v1, respectively. And we let P3
and P4 correspond to the edges common to both flows on the top path and the bottom path
from u2 to v2, respectively as shown in Figure 9. Lastly, we define `1 = |{e ∈ P1
⋂
E}|, `2 =
|{e ∈ P2
⋂
E}|, `3 = |{e ∈ P3
⋂
E}| and `4 = |{e ∈ P4
⋂
E}|. Remember that f1 = fˆ1 = r1 and
Figure 9: Two cycles - one cycle per each commodity.
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f2 = fˆ2 = r2 due to the definition of atomic network model in this section.
Three cases are enough to be considered: Note the f and fˆ correspond to a NE flow
and a social optimum flow. We consider all possible cases when commodity 1 flow is considered
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Figure 10: All Cases
as a primary flow as shown in Figure 10. (The notation used is S vs S′, where S is the set
of flows on the top path and S′ the set of flows on the bottom path): (1) {f1, f2, fˆ2} vs.
{fˆ1, fˆ2}, (2) {f1, f2, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1, f2}, (3) {f1, f2} vs. {fˆ1, f2, fˆ2}, (4) {f1, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1, f2, fˆ2}, (5)
{f1, f2} vs. {fˆ1, fˆ2}, (6) {f1, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1, f2}, (7) {f1, f2} vs. {fˆ1}, (8) {f1, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1}, (9)
{f1, f2, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1, f2, fˆ2}, (10) {f1} vs. {fˆ1, f2}, (11) {f1} vs. {fˆ1}, (12) {f1} vs. {fˆ1, fˆ2},
(13) {f1, f2, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1}, (14) {f1} vs. {fˆ1, f2, fˆ2}, (15) {f1, fˆ2} vs. {fˆ1, fˆ2} and (16) { f1, f2}
vs. {fˆ1, f2}. By reversing fˆ1, each of the structures considered becomes a directed cycle. As
mentioned before f2 or fˆ2 (or both) use edges in these cycles. Table 5 lists the cases and a
ratio of CNE(f) to CSO(fˆ) variational inequality
case 1,5 f1Φ1(f1,f2)
fˆ1Φ′2(fˆ1,fˆ2)+fˆ1Φ
′′
2 (fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ2(f1, 0),Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ2(0, f2)
case 2,16 f1Φ1(f1,f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0)
case 3,9 f1Φ1(f1,f2)
fˆ1Φ′2(fˆ1,fˆ2)+fˆ1Φ
′′
2 (fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0)
case 4,14 f1Φ1(f1,0)
fˆ1Φ′2(fˆ1,fˆ2)+fˆ1Φ
′′
2 (fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0)
case 6,10,11 f1Φ1(f1,0)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0)
case 7,13 f1Φ1(f1,f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ2(f1, 0),Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ2(0, f2)
case 8 f1Φ1(f1,0)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ2(f1, 0)
case 12,15 f1Φ1(f1,0)
fˆ1Φ′2(fˆ1,fˆ2)+fˆ1Φ
′′
2 (fˆ1,0)
Φ1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ2(f1, 0)
Table 5: CNE(f)/CSO(fˆ) for all cases
corresponding (variational) inequality (we use the term, variational inequality here imprecisely
simply to emphasize properties of the solution ) obtained by the flow being Nash equilibrium.
Let us consider case 16 to show an example of how to construct formulas for CNE(f)/CSO(fˆ)
using the corresponding variational inequality. There are two NE flows f1 and f2 over the top
path, and the cost of NE for commodity 1 is f1Φ1(f1, f2); while, the cost of SO for commodity
1 is incurred only by fˆ1 which results in fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0). Its corresponding variational inequality
is Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0) since a shift of flow f1 to the bottom path (note that f2
already exists) does not decrease the cost incurred by f1 and f2 over the top path.
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(i) cases 1, 5, 7 and 13: Note that both case 1 and case 5 have the same ratio of CNE(f)
to CSO(fˆ) and variational inequality, and case 7 and case 13 use the same ratio of CNE(f) to
CSO(fˆ) and variational inequality. Then price of anarchy as computed in case 1 and case 5 is
upper bounded by that computed in case 7(case 13) since the divisor in case 7(case 13) is smaller
than divisors in other two cases since f1 = fˆ1 = r1 and f2 = fˆ2 = r2.
In case 7 (or 13), note that there is no social optimum flow from commodity 2 in the ratio
of CNE(f) to CSO(fˆ), and the NE cost incurred by commodity 2 can be considered from cycles
with flow of commodity 2. However, f2 has impact on latency of f1, and we consider f1Φ1(f1, f2)
as cost incurred by f1 and f2.
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ f1Φ1(f1, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0)
≤ r1Φ1(r1, r2)
r1Φ2(r1, 0)
≤ r1Φ1(r1, r2)
r1Φ1(r1, r2)
= 1.
The first inequality holds since f1 = fˆ1 = r1 and f2 = fˆ2 = r2 due to the definition of atomic
unsplittable flow. The last inequality holds since Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ2(f1, 0) due to its corresponding
variational inequality.
(ii) cases 2, 3, 9 and 16: Since the divisor for case 2 and case 16 is smaller than divisors
in case 3 and case 9, the price of anarchy in case 3 and case 9 are dominated by the other two
cases. For both case 2 or case 16, we have the following inequality:
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ f1Φ1(f1, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0)
(21)
≤ f1Φ
′
2(f1, f2) + f1Φ
′′
2(f1, 0)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0)
(22)
=
r1Φ
′
2(r1, r2) + r1Φ
′′
2(r1, 0)
r1Φ2(r1, 0)
(23)
≤ Φ2(r1, r2)
Φ2(r1, 0)
(24)
=
a2`2(ar1 + r2 + c
′
2)
a2`2(ar1 + c′2)
≤ 1 + r2
ar1
(25)
In (22), Φ1(f1, f2) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0) due to the corresponding variational inequality. We
have c′2 = c2/a2 in (25). It seems that the price of anarchy for these cases are not bounded since
f2 appears in the dividend while the divisor does not include fˆ2. However, if r2 is big enough
(larger than a
√
ar1) then r2 play an important role. Thus, we consider splitting into two cases
: r2 ≤ a
√
ar1 and r2 > a
√
ar1. In the case that r2 ≤ a
√
ar1, the price of anarchy is bounded by√
a+ 1.
We next discuss the price of anarchy when r2 > a
√
ar1. Note that we assume that there is an
intersection of a commodity 2 cycle with this cycle when r2 > a
√
ar1. If there is no intersection
with a commodity 2 cycle, then f1 can be shifted from the top path to the bottom path leading
to less delay. If the delay on the top path and the delay on the bottom path are the same,
then there is no cycle. Suppose that the shift from the top path to the bottom path of f1 does
not decrease delay. It implies that the cost of the bottom path is greater than the cost of the
top path and potentially violates utilizing the bottom path by fˆ1 is less cost than using the top
path.
Let us consider the cycle of commodity 2. f2 goes along top path overlapped with f1 or fˆ1
on the bottom path. The flow f2 and the other flow fˆ2 forms the cycle of commodity 2 which is
intersecting with a cycle shown in case 2. For this cycle, we derive the price of anarchy via the
27
corresponding variational inequality.
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ f2Φ
′
1(f1, f2) + f2Φ2(0, f2) + f2Φ
′
3(f1, f2) + f2Φ
′′
3(0, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ4(0, fˆ2)
+
f1Φ
′
1(f1, f2) + f1Φ
′′
1(f1, 0)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ4(0, fˆ2)
(26)
≤ f1Φ
′
2(f1, f2) + f1Φ
′′
2(f1, 0) + f2Φ4(f1, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ4(0, fˆ2)
(27)
≤ f1Φ2(f1, f2) + f2Φ4(f1, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ4(0, fˆ2)
(28)
=
r1Φ2(r1, r2) + r2Φ4(r1, r2)
r1Φ2(r1, 0) + r2Φ4(0, r2)
(29)
=
r1`2(ar1 + r2 + c
′
2) + r2`4(ar1 + r2 + c
′
4)
r1`2(ar1 + c′2) + r2`4(r2 + c′4)
(30)
=
r1`(ar1 + r2 + c
′
2) + r2(ar1 + r2 + c
′
4)
r1`(ar1 + c′2) + r2(r2 + c′4)
(31)
= 1 +
r1r2`+ ar1r2
r1`(ar1 + c′2) + r2(r2 + c′4)
. (32)
We have Φ′1(f1, f2)+Φ2(0, f2)+Φ′3(f1, f2)+Φ′′3(0, f2) ≤ Φ4(f1, f2) due to the variational inequal-
ity for commodity 2 and Φ′1(f1, f2) + Φ′′1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ′2(f1, f2) + Φ′′2(f1, 0) due to the variational
inequality for commodity 1. By these observations, we can obtain (27) from the previous equa-
tion. Inequality (28) can be obtained by summing over Φ′2(f1, f2) and Φ′′2(f1, 0) by replacing
Φ′′2(f1, 0) as Φ′′2(f1, f2). Let ` = `2/`4 where `2 and `4 represent the number of edges on path
2 and path 4, respectively. Also, let c′2 = c2/a2, c′4 = c4/a2 throughout this chapter. From the
above variational inequality Φ′1(f1, f2) + Φ2(0, f2) + Φ′3(f1, f2) + Φ′′3(0, f2) ≤ Φ4(f1, f2) we have
Φ2(0, f2) ≤ Φ4(f1, f2) and further
` = `2/`4 ≤ ar1 + r2 + c
′
4
r2 + c′2
≤ ar1 + r2 + c
′
4
r2
.
When
ar1+r2+c′4
r2+c′2
≤ 1, let ` be 0 in the divisor and be 1 for the dividend. Then, equation (32)
can be written as
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ 1 + r1r2 + ar1r2
r2(r2 + c′4)
≤ 1 + r1r2 + ar1r2
r22
≤ 2 + 1√
a
. (33)
The last inequality holds because r2 ≥ a
√
ar1, and a ≥ 1. When ar1+r2+c
′
4
r2+c′2
≥ 1, note that
ar1+r2+c′4
r2
≥ 1 is true. Equation (32) can be written as
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ 1 + r1r2(ar1 + r2 + c
′
4)/r2 + ar1r2
r1`(ar1 + c′2) + r2(r2 + c′4)
(34)
≤ 1 + r1(r2/
√
a+ r2 + c
′
4) + ar1r2
r1`(ar1 + c′2) + a
√
ar1(r2 + c′4)
(35)
≤ 1 + (a+ 1 + 1/
√
a)r2 + c
′
4
`(ar1 + c′2) + a
√
a(r2 + c′4)
(36)
≤ 1 + (a+ 1 + 1/
√
a)r2 + c
′
4
a
√
a(r2 + c′4)
≤ 1 + 1√
a
+
2
a
√
a
(37)
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Observe that `(ar1 + c
′
2) can be ignored to obtain the upper bound in (37). In equations, to
maximize the price of anarchy we substitute r1 with r2/a
√
a in the dividend; while in the divisor
we substitute r2 with a
√
ar1.
(iii) cases 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15: Note that the divisors in case 6, 10 and 11 are
smaller than the divisors in other cases, and the dividend in case 6, 10 and 11 are bigger than
others due to the variational inequality.
We consider one of the cases 6, 10 and 11. As shown in previous case, we need to consider
commodity 1’s cycle and commodity 2’s cycle to estimate the price of anarchy. We provide a
proof of a case when fˆ2 is utilizing the top path. Let us consider case 6 which upper bounds
other two cases. we split into three sub-cases: (a) r1 ≤ r2 ≤ (a)1/2r1, (b) r1 > r2 and (c)
r2 > (a)
1/2r1. In case (a),
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ f1Φ1(f1, 0) + f2Φ2(0, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ1(0, fˆ2)
(38)
≤ f1Φ2(f1, f2) + f2Φ2(0, f2)
fˆ1Φ2(fˆ1, 0) + fˆ2Φ1(0, fˆ2)
(39)
≤ r1Φ2(r1, r2) + r2Φ2(0, r2)
r1Φ2(r1, 0) + r2Φ1(0, r2)
(40)
≤ r1Φ2(r1, r2) + r2Φ2(0, r2)
r1Φ2(r1, 0)
(41)
≤ Φ2(r1, r2)
Φ2(r1, 0)
+
r2
r1
Φ2(0, r2)
Φ2(r1, 0)
(42)
≤ 1 + `2
√
ar1
`2(ar1 + c′2)
+
r2
r1
`2(
√
ar1 + c
′
2)
`2(ar1 + c′2)
(43)
≤ 1/√a+ 2 (44)
Due to the variational inequality, we have (39) by replacing Φ1(f1, 0) with Φ2(f1, f2). In in-
equality (43), we substitute r2 with
√
ar1. In case (b), we start at (40) to avoid duplicate
formulas.
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ r1`1(ar1 + r2 + c
′
2) + r2`2(r2 + c
′
2)
r1`1(ar1 + c′2) + r2`2(r2 + c′1)
(45)
≤ 1 + `1r1r2 + `2r2c
′
2
`1(ar21 + r1c
′
2) + `2(r
2
2 + r2c
′
1)
(46)
≤ 1 + max( r1r2
ar21 + r
2
2
,
r2c
′
2
r1c′2 + r2c′1
) (47)
≤ 1 + max( 1
ar1/r2 + r2/r1
, 1) ≤ 1 (48)
Due to Lemma 3.8, (47) holds. In equation (48), the divisor is minimized when r1/r2 is close to
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1. Lastly, in case (c),
CNE(f)
CSO(fˆ)
≤ `1f1(af1 + c
′
1) + `2f2(f2 + c
′
2)
`1fˆ2(fˆ2 + c′1) + `2fˆ1(afˆ1 + c′2)
(49)
≤ `f1(af1 + c
′
1) + f2(f2 + c
′
2)
`fˆ2(fˆ2 + c′1) + fˆ1(afˆ1 + c′2)
(50)
≤ `r1(ar1 + c
′
1) + r2(r2 + c
′
2)
`r2(r2 + c′1) + r1(ar1 + c′2)
(51)
≤
r1(ar1 + c
′
1)
ar1+r2+c′2
ar1+c′1
+ r2(r2 + c
′
2)
r2(r2 + c′1)
r2+c′2
ar1+r2+c′1
+ r1(ar1 + c′2)
(52)
≤ r1(ar1 + r2 + c
′
2) + r2(r2 + c
′
2)
r2
r2+c′2√
a+1
+ r1(ar1 + c′2)
(53)
≤ (r1r2
r2
r2+c′2√
a+1
+ r1(ar1 + c′2)
+
r1(ar1 + c
′
2) + r2(r2 + c
′
2)
r2
r2+c′2√
a+1
+ r1(ar1 + c′2)
(54)
≤ r1r2
r22√
a+1
+ ar21
+
√
a+ 1 (55)
≤
√
(
√
a+ 1)
2
√
a
+
√
a+ 1 ≤ √a+ 2. (56)
By dividing by `2 we obtain (50), and we further have (51) due to the definition of atomic
unsplittable. Due to the variational inequality, we have Φ1(f1, 0) ≤ Φ2(f1, f2) and Φ2(0, f2) ≤
`Φ1(f1, f2) where ` = `1/`2 and `1 and `2 represent the number of edges in path 1 and path
2 respectively. Inequality (52) is derived from the previous inequality by using the varia-
tional inequality. Further, by dividing by r2 + c
′
1 and substituting r1 with r2/
√
a, we have
(53). In other words,
r2+c′1
ar1+r2+c′1
≥ r2+c′1√
ar2+r2+c′1
≥ 1√
a+1
. Since
r1(ar1+c′2)+r2(r2+c
′
2)
r2
r2+c
′
2√
a+1
+r1(ar1+c′2)
≤ (√a +
1)
r1(ar1+c′2)+r2(r2+c
′
2)
r2(r2+c′2)+r1(ar1+c
′
2)
=
√
a+ 1 due to a ≥ 1, we have (55). In (55), r1/r2 = 1/
√
a(
√
a+ 1) and
thus we have the second last inequality. Since a ≥ 1,
√
(
√
a+1)
2
√
a
≤ 1 and our case analysis and
proof is complete.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the price of anarchy for k-commodity non-atomic and atomic
network flows with heterogeneous and decomposable delay functions. We have also obtained
improved bounds on the price of anarchy for 2-commodity atomic flows with heterogeneous
uniform delay functions.
Further studies could include convex functions that model the behavior of network queue
delays more accurately, in order to shed more light on the impact of differentiated services.
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